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Abstract
In the last two decades, experimental papers on distributive justice have
abounded. Two main results have been replicated. Firstly, there is a multi-
plicity of fairness rules. Secondly, fairness decisions di er depending on the
context. This paper studies individual consistency in the use of fairness rules,
as well as the structural factors that lead people to be inconsistent. We use a
within-subject design, which allows us to compare individual behavior when
the context changes. In line with the literature, we ﬁnd a multiplicity of
fairness rules. However, when we control for consistency, the set of fairness
rules is considerably smaller. Only selﬁshness and strict egalitarianism seem
to survive the stricter requirement of consistency. We observe that this result
is mainly explained by a self-serving bias. Participants select the rule that is
individually optimal in each situation.
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1 Motivation
The concept of fairness is at the very core of many developments in Behavioral Eco-
nomics and the Psychology of Judgment and Decision-Making. It was ﬁrst studied
under the analytical framework of equity theory (Homans 1961; Adams 1965; Sel-
ten 1978; Guth 1988). Subsequently, several one-size-ﬁts-all theories were proposed
(Rabin 1993; Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Charness and
Rabin 2002). More recently, several studies have claimed that individual fairness
concerns can better be captured by a multiplicity of fairness rules (Frohlich et al.
2004; Cappelen et al. 2007).
The objectives of this paper are twofold. Firstly, the application of di erent fairness
rules is experimentally studied in the context of a two-person distribution game pre-
ceded by a real-e ort task. Secondly and more importantly, individual consistency
in the application of fairness rules is scrutinized.
The plurality of fairness ideals hypothesis assumes that di erent individuals rely
on di erent normative standards when they decide in a distribution problem. In a
real e ort experiment, Frohlich et al (2004) ﬁnd that, besides selﬁshness, there are
two other main behavioral patterns that classify individual decisions. Both, just-
dessert and egalitarian rules explain a higher proportion of decisions than selﬁsh
behavior. Cappelen et al (2007) report similar results. They propose a pluralism
of fairness ideals, where the concept of just dessert is decomposed in the liberal
egalitarian ideal (accountability principle in Konow 2000) and the libertarian ideal.
The di erent rules are reviewed in more detail in Section 2.
The ﬁnding of several well-deﬁned behavioral patterns in experimental distributions
problems raises two important questions. First, what proportion of individuals
follows each of the proposed rules? And second, do individuals behave consistently
with one single ideal or do they change their ideal depending on the context? The
answer to these two questions is important because it would be di cult to accept the
existence of a rule that is hardly ever chosen, or that is abandoned when the context
slightly changes. There are reasons, however, to expect individuals to deviate from
a previously applied rule.
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Acting in accordance with a particular behavioral rule does not necessarily imply
that a subject always adheres to the fairness ideal this behavioral regularity is based
on. For instance, it has been shown in both psychological and economic experiments
that individual decisions in fairness contexts display a self-serving bias (Messik and
Sentis 1979; Babcock et al. 1995; Konow 2000). If the self-serving bias hypothesis is
true, subjects will ﬁnd strong reasons for switching between di erent fairness rules as
their decision-making context changes. To put it di erently, is the self-serving bias
a good predictor of individual inconsistencies in a repeated distribution problem?
To address this question, we use a within-subjects design. The experiment consists
of twenty-period. Each period contains two sub-periods, the real e ort task in the
former and the distribution decision task in the latter. The total amount of money to
be distributed depends on both, discretional (e ort) and exogenous (random shock)
variables. This design allows us to study individual (in)consistent behavior when the
context changes, and to answer our main question concerning the role of self-serving
bias.
Participants’ decisions in the ﬁrst period of our experiment are very similar to results
reported in previous studies. We ﬁnd a multiplicity of fairness rules. However,
when we explore individual consistency across periods, we ﬁnd that selﬁsh and
strict egalitarian participants are strikingly consistent. In contrast, no participant
consistently follows the liberal egalitarian nor the libertarian ideals suggested in
the previous literature. Moreover, we are reasonably conﬁdent to conclude that
inconsistencies in our experiment are driven by a self-serving bias. Our statistical
analysis conﬁrms that inconsistent people are highly and signiﬁcantly more likely to
choose the rule that beneﬁts them the most.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews previous studies on the
multiplicity of fairness rules and self-serving bias. Section 3 describes the experi-
mental design and the fairness rules we use in this work. Section 4 derives some
predictions. In section 5 the results are presented. Finally, section 6 discusses the
results and concludes.
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2 Multiplicity of Fairness Rules and Self-serving
Bias
Although the experimental study of equity goes back to Homans (1961) and Adams
(1965), only recently has there been an explosion of economic papers that ex-
plore how individuals distribute the beneﬁts of joint production (see, among others,
Konow 2000 and Cherry et al. 2002). One of the main ﬁndings in this literature is
that participants’ behavior is guided by a multiplicity of normative standards.
Frohlich et al. (2004) extends the inequity aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) incorporating a social context. Participants perform a real-e ort task and
subsequently distribute the joint production. They ﬁnd that more than half of the
individuals share the joint earnings according to the just dessert (equity) rule. They
also ﬁnd a non-negligible number of egalitarian participants (27.5%), and only 10%
of selﬁsh individuals. Frohlich et al. (2004) stress the role of entitlement in the
interpretation of their results. Furthermore, they ﬁnd evidence of a self-serving
bias.
In Cappelen et al. (2007), participants have to decide how much they want to
invest in a group account, keeping the part of the endowment they do not invest.
Afterwards, they have to distribute the total income produced by the group. Players
only di er in the rates of return assigned to their investment. The authors ﬁnd
a pluralism of fairness ideals. They also ﬁnd that participants’ decisions are not
biased, in the sense that they do not endorse the fairness ideal that most beneﬁt
them. This result is not in line with previous literature, which predominantly ﬁnds
di erent types of self-serving bias.
Self-serving bias seems to be an important phenomenon when individuals can rely
on several rules when they have to make fairness decisions. In a hypothetical ex-
periment, Messick and Sentis (1979) ﬁnd an egocentric bias in fairness judgments.
They show that non-strict equality subjects consider it fair to be paid more than
the other participant, when they both work the same amount of hours. Similarly,
they think that being paid equally is fair when they work fewer hours than their
partner.
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In economic experiments, Konow (2000) models and tests cognitive dissonance in a
standard distribution problem. He uses a joint production task where discretional
as well as exogenous variables are present. The conﬂict between self-interest and
fairness leads subjects to self-deception, and hence to behave in a self serving bias
fashion.
Babcock et al. (1995)1 ask subjects to judge real trial cases. Participants play either
the role of plainti  or defendant, and they have to reach a settlement and to provide
arguments supporting their decision. Introducing a richer context in the experiment
allows subjects to focus on the arguments that favor themselves. The authors show
that settlements are more di cult because the arguments of the di erent players
are biased towards their own interests.
Previous studies on the self-serving bias phenomenon have two main limitations.
First, some of them use non-incentivized methods to elicit fairness ideals. This is
the case of survey and hypothetical experiments (Konow 1996; Messick and Sentis
1979). But, as Konow (2005: 359) puts it, ‘Although studies with and without real
stakes lead to similar conclusions, some results are a ected by the presence of real
stakes, such as the average level of unfairness.’
The second limitation of the self-serving bias literature is related to the type of
empirical analysis typically used in this literature. Studies on social preferences
have mostly tested their hypothesis with an aggregate level data technique. If we
are interested, however, in the study of behavioral (in)consistencies or in the self-
serving bias problem, this type of analysis could lead to a wrong interpretation of the
data. To understand individual behavioral inconsistencies, a within subject analysis
is essential. Andreoni and Miller (2002), Fisman et al. (2007) and Blanco et al.
(2010) among others, have used individual-level analyses to test the consistency of
models of other-regarding preferences.
Using a design that shares some features with the one presented in this paper,
Brosig et al. (2007) analyze the consistency and stability of individual behavior
across games. They use a within-subject design where participants face the same
group of games repeatedly. They ﬁnd that selﬁsh subjects are consistent across
1See also Babcock et al (1993, 1996, 1997).
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games. They also show that only selﬁsh decisions are stable over time.
We build on this existing literature by performing a within-subjects analysis in the
context of a real-e ort experiment. By the manipulation of exogenous and endoge-
nous variables, we study whether participants rely on di erent normative standards
and whether these normative standards are selected in a self-serving manner.
3 Experimental Design and Procedures
3.1 Experimental Design
The experiment consists of 20 one-shot pure distribution games with production.
In each one-shot, participants play two phases. At the beginning of the ﬁrst phase
random pairs are formed. The same two subjects take part in the ﬁrst and the
second phase. In the ﬁrst phase participants perform a real e ort task. In the
second phase, subjects face a pure distribution problem.
Production phase
The goal of the production phase is to induce a feeling of entitlement by using a real-
e ort task. The real-e ort task consists of a series of puzzles in which the letters of
a word have been scrambled. Subjects have to unscramble as many puzzles as they
can out of ten.2 Individuals are endowed with initial endowments corresponding
to their e ort in this phase. For each word they correctly unscramble they get 4
tokens. Individual and group endowments are common knowledge.
After the production phase, a random shock is introduced. Each individual outcome
has an independent 50% probability to be a ected. The shock halves participants’
endowment, thus the group endowment is also reduced. In this experiment, both
discretionary and non-discretionary variables can potentially di er among subjects.
2The real e ort task is taken from Carpenter et al (2010).
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Distribution phase
In the second phase, participants face a pure distribution problem. Both members
of the group have to decide anonymously how to distribute, between them, the joint
beneﬁts after the shock.3 They do not receive any feedback until the end of the
experiment, preventing them from forming expectations about others’ behavior, so
trying to rule out reciprocity.
In every one-shot, participants are randomly paired with another participant in the
room. A random stranger mechanism is used. At the end of the experiment, the
computer randomly chooses one period and one decision for each pair to be paid.
The exchange rate is 3 tokens=1 pound.
3.2 Fairness Rules
After the experiment, participants’ decisions are classiﬁed according to several fair-
ness rules. In this paper, we use the deﬁnition of fairness ideals proposed by Cap-















3If a shock has occurred at all.
4We use the deﬁnition of libertarian as output equity as proposed by Cappelen et al. (2007).
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m
L(a,q)=a1q1 (3)
mk {mSE,m L,m LE} represents the di erent fairness ideals, and it corresponds to
the amount a particular subject keeps for herself.
X(a,q) represents the ﬁnal outcome to be distributed, and it comes from the amount
produced by both subjects i, where i {1,2}. In this case the outcome could be
a ected by two variables: discretional (q) and exogenous (a) variables.
X(a,q)=x1(a1,q 1)+x2(a2,q 2) (4)
xi = aiqi (5)
In our experiment, a is determined by an external shock, which subjects have no
control over. In contrast, q corresponds to subjects’ e ort in the production phase,
which of course can be discretionally a ected by subjects. a and q take the following
values:
a   {0.5,1} (6)
q   [0,40] (7)
Variables, q and a, change across the 20 one-shot games producing heterogeneity
in the ﬁnal outcomes. This heterogeneity allows us to study the (in)consistency of
subjects’ decisions.
The rationale for modeling the non-discretionary component of the model as an
This is not of course the only deﬁnition of libertarian that one can ﬁnd in the social science and
philosophical literatures.
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external shock is the real-world observation that production is often a ected by
exogenous shocks, e.g. meteorological conditions.
Imagine, for instance, two tomato-ﬁeld workers working for the same company. They
farm tomatoes in two smallholdings situated in di erent ﬁelds. They are equally
productive, and hence earn the same wage. But, sometimes at the beginning of the
harvest, strong storms occur in one of the ﬁelds, causing the crop to fail. The boss
receives less money for this incident, and also has less money to pay his employees.
On the one hand, both peasants have put the same e ort into their work, but on the
other hand only one production has been successful. In view of this situation the
principal has to decide how to distribute the money produced to pay the wages of the
two workers. The question is: which is the fair distribution for each worker? The
same question arises when the exogenous shock does not happen, but the productions
of the two peasants di er because one of them cultivates the tomatoes better and
produces a higher amount as a consequence. The two situations described, and any
combination of the two, creates a dilemma: how should the beneﬁts be distributed?
3.3 Experimental Procedures
The experiment took place at CESS at Nu eld College, University of Oxford. Sub-
jects were 60 students5 from 26 di erent ﬁelds at the University of Oxford6 who were
recruited using ORSEE (Greiner 2004). Also, we balanced the data to have half of
them male and half female. The experiment was run using z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007)
and lasted for about 90 minutes. Subjects were randomly assigned to one computer
terminal. We gave a copy of the instructions to subjects and then a research assistant
read the instructions aloud. To assure that everyone understood the instructions
we asked them to complete a control questionnaire. After the experiment, par-
ticipants ﬁlled in a post-experimental questionnaire in which we asked them some
socio-demographic questions and questions related to the rules and strategies they
5Subjects were originally from English speaker countries (England, Ireland, Canada, and USA)
only one participant was Swiss.
6We want to have a heterogeneity of students in order to avoid to have a large mass of ‘selﬁsh
economists’ (Frank et al, 1993), and hence have a better representation of the society.
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had followed. Subjects earned 11.5 GBP on average, ranged from a minimum of 6
GBP to a maximum of 26 GBP, including the show-up fee of 4 GBP and 2 GBP for
the post experimental questionnaire (announced after the experiment was over).
4 Predictions
The experiment describe above is designed to answer three questions: Are partici-
pants heterogeneous with respect to the rule they follow in the distribution phase?
Are participants consistent across slightly di erent situations? Are participants’
preferences for fairness self-serving? Relying on prior literature, we tentatively de-
rive the following predictions.
1. Participants’ behavior can be better described by a multiplicity of fairness
rules. Speciﬁcally, we expect to ﬁnd participants whose decisions can be clas-
siﬁed by either a purely selﬁsh behavioral rule or the three fairness rules ex-
plained above.
2. Participants that display purely selﬁsh behavior are consistent across contexts.
By consistency we mean that a particular individual follows always the same
behavioral rule, independently of the context. This will be more common
among selﬁsh subjects because they do not face any trade-o  between selﬁsh
consumption and other-regarding motives. Once they act selﬁshly, they would
not ﬁnd reasons to deviate from their maximizing strategy. Hence, subjects
will take consistently selﬁsh decisions over time and across contexts. This is
indeed what Brosig et al (2007) ﬁnd.
3. Non-selﬁsh decisions are context-dependent (List 2007; Bardsley 2008). Hence,
those individuals who are motivated by notions of fairness behave more incon-
sistently. Deviating from fairness rules will be more likely to occur than devia-
tions from a purely selﬁsh behavior. Deviations can be due to the self-serving
bias phenomena, (see among others, Miller and Ross 1975; Arkin, et al 2007)
leading participants to make inconsistent choices. We predict that subjects
endowed with preferences for fairness will chose the fairness rule that beneﬁts
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them the most in any given moment. The amount participants will take for
themselves in a given one period, mit, will be given by the following options:
mit = mSE if mSE >m LE and mSE >m L
mit = mLE if mLE >m SE and mLE >m L
mit = mL if mL >m SE and mL >m LE
In our experiment subjects will face di erent contexts. The heterogeneity of situa-
tions in the experiment guarantees that one speciﬁc rule is more beneﬁcial in one
context but not in all the contexts. Thus, unselﬁsh subjects will consider as fair
di erent distributions according to the most proﬁtable rule in each situation.
5 Results
The data comprise 5 experimental sessions involving a total of 60 subjects. Each
session lasted for 20 periods. Given that each subject makes a decision in each of
the 20 periods, we have a total of 20 x 60 = 1200 distribution decisions.
In this section, we ﬁrst present some descriptive statistics to show a general picture
of the data. We then classify decisions using the three fairness rules described in
section 3. After that, we explore individual consistency across periods. Finally, we
analyze the factors that lead participants to take inconsistent decisions.
5.1 Frequency of di erent allocation rules
Figure 1 shows the relative amount participants allocate to their partner. As it
is commonly found in standard dictator games (Camerer 2003), the distribution
is bimodal with peaks at 0% and 50%, corresponding to the typical allocation of a
purely selﬁsh and a strict egalitarian person, respectively. Allocations between these
two points, as well as those above the 50-50 distribution, indicate the presence of
additional behavioral rules.
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Figure 1: Relative amount allocated to the other participant
Table 1 reports the percentage and the frequency of decisions taken according to
one of the fairness rule we consider in this paper. We classify decisions according to
the exact prediction of each rule. The large majority of decisions are either purely
selﬁsh or can be classiﬁed using one of the three fairness ideals described in section
3, and this is true for period one (70%) as well as for the twenty periods (69%). An
additional rule, deﬁned as Charity, explains an extra 10% of behavior.7 All other
decisions that are not able to classify are in the ’Other group’. Given that 80% of
decisions exactly coincide with one of the ﬁve behavioral rules described so far, in
the following analyses we will not put any additional structure on the data in order
to avoid an over-ﬁtting of the data.8
7The group deﬁned as Charity consists of subjects that give less than 4 tokens and more than
nothing. Note that the exchange rate is 3 tokens 1 GBP. Frohlich et al (2004) and Becker and
Miller (2009) ﬁnd a similar rule of behaviour. This behaviour is, moreover, conﬁrmed by the
answers subjects gave in the post-experimental questionnaire. For instance, subject 16 answered
the question ‘Have you followed any particular rule to distribute the total number of tokens?’ in
the following way: ‘Largest number divisible by three’ .
8Notice that the sum of the percentage in Table 1 is higher than 100%. That is because of in
some cases the prediction of the di erent rules coincided.
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Rules 1 period 20 periods
Strict Egalitarian 13/60(21.7%) 222/1200(18.5%)





Total explained 81.7% 78.2%
Total 111.7% 109.9%)
Table 1: Percentage and frequency of decisions according to one rule.
In this kind of situation it is realistic to assume some behavioural noise around the
point predictions. Treating an one-token deviation above or below the prediction
for each rule as noise, we do not classify much more decisions (82%) (See Table
5 in the appendix). Doing a k-means cluster analysis,9 which classify decision in
di erent categories (selﬁsh, strict egalitarian, liberal egalitarian, libertarian, charity
and other) we obtain similar results (see Table 6 in the Appendix).
Given the nature of our data, assuming some deviations (errors) poses a trade-o . In
some cases, the predictions of several rules are very close to one another. Therefore,
allowing for some deviations may increase the number of classiﬁed decisions, but it
also increases the risk of classifying the same decision in more than one category. If
we allow for a one-token mistake, we are not able to disentangle whether this subject
is acting in a strict egalitarian or in a libertarian way.
The percentage of coincidence increase as we increase the size of the permitted
deviation. Table 5 shows that this percentage goes from 9.8% to 41.9%. In addi-
tion, small deviations from the theoretical rule’s prediction are not always mistakes.
When we consider fairness decisions, small deviations can also reﬂect a self-serving
9This method of cluster analysis classiﬁes observations into k number of clusters, in which each
observation belongs to the cluster with the nearest mean. Alternative clustering methods provide
similar results.
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behavior10 This is shown by Figures 4 and 5 in the Appendix, where most of the
deviations in allocations to self are above what one fairness rule predicts. After all
these considerations and with 80% of the individual decisions precisely classiﬁed, we
will not assume any deviation, and the results can be interpreted as a lower bound
in rule-following behavior.
Focusing now on the frequency of di erent behavioral rules here considered, we ﬁnd
that selﬁsh behavior is considerably above the level reported in previous real-e ort
experiments. In our experiment, more than 40% of decisions can be classiﬁed as
selﬁsh, in contrast to 30% reported in Cappelen et al. (2007) and 10% reported
in Frohlich et al. (2004). About 20% of decisions coincide with a strict egalitarian
rule, and slightly less than 20% with liberal egalitarian (8.8%) or a libertarian (8.9%)
rules. These levels are below the ones reported in previous studies.11
At an aggregate level, the frequencies of decisions in the ﬁrst period (left column,
table 1) and in the complete experiment (right column, table 1) are strikingly similar.
We will explore the consistency of decisions at the individual level in the next section.
Before that, we will study whether participants’ behavior evolve over time as well
as other behavioral determinants.
5.2 Behavioral determinants
Figure 2 plots the period-average relative amount participants keep in the distribu-
tion phase. We observe that subjects keep on average 75% of the total joint amount
being the trend slightly increasing.
Table 2 displays the results of a ﬁxed e ect model.12 Our dependent variable is the
10This statement is supported by the answer of subject 35 to the question Q5: Have you followed
any particular rule to distribute the total number of tokens?. A: Try to be fair, while obviously
favouring myself slightly.
11Papers that study the multiplicity of fairness rules have predominantly focused on one-shot
games. The repeated setting that we study may lead to an increase of selﬁsh behaviour.
12We have the same results using a random e ects GLS model with clustering at the individual
level.
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Figure 2: Distribution across periods
relative amount subjects keep for themselves. The variables we consider relevant for
explaining distribution behavior are the following: Period that takes values from 1
to 20. Shock is a dummy that takes value 1 if the participant has su ered a shock in
this period and 0 otherwise. Final Endowment is the subject’s relative contribution
to the total amount after the shock.
We observe that Period and Final Endowment a ect individual decisions. As we
have observed in Figure 4, subjects tend to keep for themselves a higher proportion
of the total joint amount as time goes on. It seems that subjects learn to behave
selﬁshly, that is in line with Brosig et al. (2007). Also, Final Endowment has a
positive e ect in subject’s decisions. They keep a higher proportion of the total
amount as their contribution increase.
In the next subsection we will show whether some subjects are immune to this e ects
and they take consistent decisions.
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Final endowment 0.115*** (0.022)
Number of observations=1200 F(59,1137)=72.90 Prob>F=0.0000
Table 2: Behavioral Determinants
Note: We use a ﬁxed-e ects model. The dependent variable is the relative amount of
money subjects keep for themselves. *** denotes signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
5.3 Consistency of individual decisions
Table 3 reports the proportion of subjects that choose consistently with one of
the rules 17 times or more.13 Only Selﬁsh, Strict Egalitarian and Charity rules
are consistently chosen. No individual distributed consistently according to Liberal
Egalitarian or Libertarian rules, even allowing for 3 inconsistent decisions.
20 times 19 times 18 times 17 times
(in every round) (in 85% of rounds)
Strict Egalitarian 3 (5%) 4 (6.6%) 6(10%) 7(11.6%)
Liberal Egalitarian 0 0 0 0
Libertarian 0 0 0 0
Selﬁsh 18(30%) 19(31.6%) 20(33.3%) 21(35%)
Charity 1(1.7%) 1(1.7%) 1(1.7%) 1(1.7%)
Table 3: Numbers and percentages of subjects applying each rule most of the time.
Figures 4 and 5 show graphically the level of individual consistency. Both ﬁgures
provide individual plots of the relation between the amount participants keep for
them and the endowment before the shock (Figure 4) and after the shock (Figure
5). More speciﬁcally, ﬁgure 4 shows whether subjects follow the Strict egalitarian
13We use three-times mistakes because no subject takes decisions according to one of the three
main fairness rules more than 12 times and less than 17 times.
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rule (middle horizontal line), the Liberal egalitarian rule (decision on the 45 line)
or they are behaving purely selﬁshly (top horizontal line). In contrast, ﬁgure 5 does
the same for the Libertarian rule (decisions in the 45 line).
Approximately half of the subjects make consistent choices, i.e., all their decision fall
along the same line. They follow the same rule across the twenty periods. In line with
our second prediction, a large number of participants (35%) are consistently selﬁsh.
However, there is a non-negligible proportion of subjects that consistently apply
the Strict Egalitarian rule (11.7%). There is only one participant that consistently
chooses distributions that ﬁt the Charity rule. Finally, we ﬁnd no single participant
that consistently applies the Liberal Egalitarian or the Libertarian ideal.
Brosig et al. (2007) ﬁnd selﬁsh subjects to be highly consistent. We additionally
show that strictly egalitarian individuals also seem to be consistent. Although this
result has not been shown in an economic experiment before, Messick and Sentis
(1979) ﬁnd that strict egalitarians are consistent with their choices using hypothet-
ical questionnaires.
In the next section we address the issue of the large number of inconsistencies.
5.4 Self-serving bias
As described in Section 4, one of the potential explanations for the inconsistency
of some participants might be self-serving bias. To test this hypothesis, we analyze
the behavior of subjects that follow some of the fairness rules presented in section
3. We then deﬁne whether the chosen rule in this period gives the highest possible
individual payo  among the three rules. We say that a rule is optimal when its
associated payo  is the highest among the three fairness rules. If a participant
mostly uses the optimal rule, we will consider her behavior self-serving.
Figure 3 shows the proportion of choices that coincides with a strict egalitarian,
a liberal egalitarian and a libertarian rule. In each column, the black area shows
the proportion of decisions that are optimal and the white area the proportion of
non-optimal decisions. The percentage of decisions taken according to one rule when
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this rule is the most advantageous is strikingly high (77.1%). Sixty-one percent of
strict egalitarian decisions were taken when this rule was the optimal. In the Liberal
egalitarian and Libertarian cases this percentage is higher, being 82.7% and 87.9%,
respectively. The percentage of strict egalitarian decisions is lower due to a pro-
portion of subjects that choose consistently this rule. Considering only inconsistent
subjects, the percentage of decisions taken according to the strict egalitarian rule
when this is the optimal rule increases considerably (76.7%). This clearly shows
that decisions from inconsistent subjects are biased.
A one-side binomial test of proportions conﬁrms our hypothesis. We reject the null
hypothesis of equal proportion of optimal and non-optimal decisions (p<0.001). It
seems that inconsistent participants are biased in a self-serving manner.14
Figure 3: Self-serving bias
For a robustness check, we now replicate the self-serving result at the individual
level, using a multinomial logit model (see Table 4). Our dependent variable has
14Subject number 2 conﬁrms that she is acting in a self-serving bias manner. She answered the
question Q8: Have you distributed: equally, proportionally before the shock, proportionally after
the shock, other; as following: ‘did all three depending on the situation’ .
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four categories: decisions taken according to the Strict Egalitarian rule, decisions
consistent with the Liberal Egalitarian rule, decisions in line with the Libertarian
prediction and all other decisions. This latter category will be used as the base
outcome for comparison.
We study the probability of choosing one of the three fairness rules. We regress the
rule chosen by subject on a dummy indicating whether this rule is optimal or not and
controlling for other control variables. Shock is a dummy variable that takes value
1 when the participant has su ered a shock in the current period and 0 otherwise.
Final Endowment represents the relative amount of money each participant has
contributed to the group account after the shock, respectively. Finally, Period takes
values from 1 to 20 and it will indicate a possible time e ect.
Consistent with the non-parametric test, we ﬁnd that the optimal rule variable pre-
dicts subjects’ behavior in all the three cases. The probability of choosing according
to one of the three fairness rules increases when this speciﬁc rule gives the highest
payo  to the subject.
Shock and Final Endowment variables also explain subjects’ behavior and reinforce
the self-serving explanation. Shock only matters in the second case, the Liberal
Egalitarian, increasing the probability of behaving according to what this rule pre-
dicts. However, Final Endowment has an impact in the probability to choose any
of the three fairness rules, although in di erent directions. The probability of be-
having as a strict egalitarian person decreases as the participant’s Final Endowment
increases. On the contrary, this variable has a positive e ect in the probability of
choosing according to the Liberal egalitarian or Libertarian rule.
The results from the multinomial logit regression are consistent with the non-
parametric results, showing a very strong association between choosing a rule and
the fact that this rule is optimal. This supports the idea that inconsistencies are
due to self-serving bias.
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Strict egalitarian Liberal egalitarian Libertarian
Optimal rule .323*** 0.288*** 0.290***
(0.042) (0.032) (0.020)
Shock -0.053 0.063** -0.001
(0.033) (0.026) (0.013)
Final endowment -0.009*** 0.005*** 0.005***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Period 0.0001 -0.0002 -0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001)
Log Likelihood=-744.6237 Observations=1337 Pseudo R2 =0.4229
Table 4: Multinomial Logit
***p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.1.
5.5 Summary of the results
We ﬁnd that the large majority of the decisions made in our experiment can be
explained with reference to a limited number of behavioral rules. 80% of choices,
both in the ﬁrst period and the whole experiment, conform to one of the following
rules: selﬁshness, strict egalitarian, liberal egalitarian, libertarian, and charity. We
observe a slight tendency but not signiﬁcant towards more selﬁsh allocations, but
fairness rules do not vanish even in the last periods of the experiment. Therefore,
we conﬁrm our ﬁrst prediction.
Although we ﬁnd a multiplicity of behavioral rules, participants do not use di erent
rules in the same way. Speciﬁcally, whereas people that choose either selﬁsh or
strict egalitarian rules are highly consistent across periods, we ﬁnd no consistent
use of either the liberal egalitarian or the libertarian rule. This conﬁrms our second
prediction regarding consistency of selﬁsh individuals. The consistency of strict
egalitarian participants is a result that we had not predicted, but that it is in line
with at least one previous study (Messick and Sentis, 1979).
Finally, we provide a reason why approximately half of the participants behave
inconsistently. We show that they apply the fairness rule that is most beneﬁcial to
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them in a given context. This means that they do not stick to a rule, but switch
between fairness rules in order to maximize their payo  at the same time that they
behave fairly.
6 Discussion
The main goal of this paper is to test the assumption of individual consistency in
fairness models (Camerer and Fehr, 2004). To achieve this end, we use a within-
subjects design where each subject makes twenty distribution decisions. Exogenous
and endogenous factors change across decisions. The manipulation of these two sets
of factors allows us to derive di erent point predictions for each rule and period, and
therefore we are able to study individual consistency across periods. This makes
our design unique to study consistent and inconsistent behavior in an incentive
compatible manner and in a repeated setting.
Interestingly, we ﬁnd that although a small set of rules can explain most of our
data, the majority of participants do not behave consistently with one rule, but
switch among di erent rules. We provide a plausible explanation about individual
inconsistencies. The self-serving bias, broadly studied in the psychological literature,
seems to be the main reason for inconsistent behavior.
We ﬁnd, however, a new result in the experimental economics literature. We pre-
dicted that only selﬁsh subjects would make consistent decisions, but we ﬁnd ex-
perimental evidence that suggests that a non-negligible number of participants con-
sistently split the pie equally. In the following, we provide an intuition for this
result.
The 50-50 norm is probably the best known and accepted rule of distributive justice.
Previous experimental results on the Ultimatum Game and related experimental
paradigms conﬁrm so (G¨ uth et al. 2001). In our experiment as well as real life,
the deﬁnition of alternative rules such as equity may be ambiguous. For instance,
participants may consider it fair to distribute the money according to e ort or to
outcomes. In contrast, the deﬁnition of the equality norm is always the same.
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An alternative explanation of the higher frequency and consistency rate of the strict
egalitarian rule is the one proposed by Andreoni and Bernheim (2009). They claim
that social image may help to explain why the equal split is a widespread norm in
many social contexts. Dividing the pie equally is a clear signal of fair behavior. On
the contrary, people may feel that an alternative fairness rule, e.g., liberal egalitarian
or libertarian, do not convey as clear signal of fairness as the egalitarian rule.
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8 Appendix
0 tokens 1 tokens 2 tokens 3 tokens
Strict Egalitarian 222(18.5%) 253(21.1%) 296(24.7%) 328(27.3%)
Liberal Egalitarian 105(8.8%) 131(10.9%) 175(14.6%) 194(16.1%)
Libertarian 107(8.9%) 143(11.9%) 205(17.1%) 239(19.9%)
Selﬁsh 513(42.8%) 558(46.5%) 598(49.8%) 622(51.8%)
Charity 109(9.1%) 136(11.3%) 159(13.3%) 233(19.4%)
Others 262(21.8%) 215(17.9%) 111(9.3%) 89(7.4%)
Total explained 938(78.2%) 985(82.1%) 1089(90.8%) 1111(92.6%)
Total 109.9% 119.6% 128.8% 141.9%
Table 5: Tokens deviations
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Possible rules 4 Categories 5 Categories 6 Categories
Strict Egalitarian 306(25.5%) 295(24.6%) 269(22.4%)
Liberal Egalitarian 119(9.9%) 104(8.7%) 84(7.0%)
Libertarian 181(15.1%) 117(9.8%) 87(7.3%)
Selﬁsh 594(49.5%) 567(47.3%) 580(48.3%)
Charity ——- 117(9.8%) 113(9.4%)
Others ——- ——- 67(5.6%)
Observations=1200 Observations=1200 Observations=1200
Pearson  2(177) = 1.8e +0 .3 Pearson  2(236) = 2.1e +0 .3 Pearson  2(295) = 2.2e +0 .3
Pr=0.000 Pr=0.000 Pr=0.000
Likelihood-ratio  2(177) = 1.8e +0 .3 Likelihood  2(236) = 2.0e +0 .3 Pearson  2(295) = 2.1e +0 .3
Pr=0.000 Pr=0.000 Pr=0.000
Table 6: Cluster analysis
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Figure 4: Strict Egalitarian and Liberal Egalitarian rule
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Figure 5: Libertarian Rule
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Instructions
Dear participants,
Welcome and thank you for participating in our experiment. The experiment will
last for about one and a half hour. Please do remain quiet from now on until the end
of the experiment. You will have the opportunity to ask questions in a few minutes,
they will be answered privately.
INSTRUCTIONS
The experiment consists of 20 periods and in each period there will be two phases.
First phase
At the beginning of every single period, groups of two people will be formed.
You will be randomly paired with another participant in this room. You will
remain together until the end of that period. None of you will know with
whom you have been paired.
On the computer screen you will see a series of puzzles in which the letters
of a word are scrambled. It is your task to unscramble them. You will see
one scrambled word at a time, with a blank below each given letter. In each
blank, enter the letter that you think belongs in that space in the correct,
unscrambled word. In each blank, please enter only one letter, with no
spaces, and use only the letters given in the original scramble. None of the
words is an acronym. The words are the same for all the participants
in this room and they will follow the same sequence.
You may use the mouse or the TAB (on the keyboard) to switch to the next
blank.
You will have a total of 90 seconds to correctly solve as many scrambles as
you can. For each correct answer, you will receive 4 tokens. In each period
there are ten words to unscramble.
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You may leave a puzzle blank, but once you click on the ’Submit and Continue
to Next Puzzle’ button, you will not be able to return to that puzzle.
At the end of the ﬁrst phase, you will know: the number of tokens you receive in
that period; the number of tokens the other participant of your group receives
in that period; and the total number of tokens the two of you receive.
First phase
The second phase starts with a random shock. This shock may a ect the
number of tokens of each participant with 50% probability. It is independent
that the other participant was a ected by the shock for you to be a ected as
well. The shock works in one of the following ways:
1. By halving your tokens;
2. By halving the tokens of the other participant;
3. By halving the tokens of both participants in the group;
4. By not halving any participant’s tokens.
Both participants in the group have to decide how to distribute the total
number of tokens of the group (your tokens + the other participant’s tokens)
between the two group members. The decision will be taken individually and
anonymously. Neither you nor the other participant will know the decision of
the other.
After the 20 periods have been completed, the computer will randomly choose
one of the twenty periods to be paid. Only the decision of one participant
in each group will be implemented. All earned tokens will be exchanged into
pounds at the end of the experiment and paid in cash according to the following
exchange rate:
3 tokens = 1
Finally, each participant will be informed about her/his earnings, which will consist
of the proﬁt from the experiment plus the participation fee ( 4).
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We ask you to remain quiet during the whole experiment. Those who do not respect
the silence requirement will be asked to leave the experimental room. Once the
experiment is ﬁnished, please remain seated. We will need between 10 and 15
minutes to calculate your payment. We will move to another room and you will be
called up successively by the number on your table; you will then receive an envelope
with your earnings and you will be asked to sign a receipt.
Finally, note that your participation is considered voluntary and you are free to
leave the room at any point if you wish to do so. In that case, we will only pay you
the participation fee of 4.
Please leave these instructions on your table when you leave the room.
You can take notes on these pages if you wish to do so.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand now.
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To make sure you understand the instructions, could you please provide an example
(of your choice) of the possible outcomes and decisions you and the other participant
in your group may make and the earnings you would get at the end of one period:
Number of words you have unscrambled (out of 10): ...
Number of words the other participant has unscrambled (out of 10): ...
Your number of tokens is (number of words you have unscrambled x 4): tokens
...
The number of tokens of the other participant is (number of words the other
participant has unscrambled x 4):tokens ...
Total number of tokens in the group (Your tokens + the other participant’s
tokens): tokens ...
Shock:
Imagine that the shock has only been a ected your number of tokens.
Number of tokens after the shock
Your number of tokens after the shock is: tokens ...
The number of tokens of the other participant is: tokens ...
Total number of tokens to be distributed: tokens ...
How much do you distribute to the other participant? tokens ...
How much does the other participant distribute to you? tokens ...
If your decision is chosen, which is your proﬁt? tokens...And the proﬁt of the
other participant? tokens ...
If the other participant’s decision is chosen, which is your proﬁt? tokens...And
the proﬁt of the other participant? tokens ...
If you have any questions about these instructions, please raise your hand now and
wait for the experimenter to come to you. Please return to the computer.





Q2: What year were you born?
Q3: Which is your nationality?
Q4: What are you studying?
Q5: Have you followed any particular rule to distribute the total number of
tokens?
Q6:
1. Have you changed the rule depending of the situation?
2. In case you used di erent rules, why did you do so?
Q7: Please, could you tell us whether some of the following factors inﬂuenced
your decision:
– Your number of tokens in the ﬁrst phase
– The number of tokens of the other participant in the ﬁrst phase
– The number of tokens of both participants in the ﬁrst phase
– Your number of tokens after the shock
– The number of tokens of the other participant after the shock
– The number of tokens of both participants after the shock
– Other factors (Please indicate)
Q8: Have you distributed:
– Equally?
– Proportionally before the shock?
– Proportionally after the shock?
– Other (Please indicate)
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